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Abstract 
The aims of the research are to assess child labor at the macro level-focusing on education- and to formulize 
national policies to address this problem in sub-Saharan Africa. We will investigate if some policies such as 
compulsory education, export banned, credit market, reduction of poverty and increase welfare programs, 
mechanization of land, population growth and foreign aid are effective to reduce child labor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Much theoretical and empirical research has been conducted at the micro level to deal with child labor (Maitra 
and Raj 2002, Jafarey and Lahiri 2002). On the other hand, not much macro analysis of child labor has been 
conducted (Cigno et al. 2002). The aims of the research are to assess child labor at the macro level-focusing on 
education- and to formulize national policies to address this problem. This paper focuses on sub-Saharan Africa1, 
which has the highest incidence of child labor. Participation rates in labor markets for children aged 10-14 years 
is 26 % in Africa, 13 % in Asia, 10 % in Latin America and only .06 % in Europe in 1995 (Ray, 2000). 41% of 
children between 5 to 14 years of age are working in sub-Saharan Africa (Andvig, 2001).  
In this paper, the main research question is why child labor exists? We will investigate if policies are suitable to 
reduce child labor: 1) compulsory education 2) export banned 3) credit market 4) reduction of poverty and 
increase welfare programs 5) mechanization of land 6) population growth 7) foreign aid. 
Child labor has been extensively researched at the micro level (Maitra and Ray 2002, Jafarey and Lahiri 2002). 
On the other hand, not much macro analysis of child labor has been conducted (Cigno et al. 2002). Cigno et al. 
(2002) searched for the potential link between international trade and child labor. They concluded that at a macro 
level, globalization does not increase child labor. The aims of this research are to assess the impact of education 
on child labor at the macro level and to suggest national policies to address this problem. 
Some have advocated restricting child labor due to two reasons: health conditions and foregone earnings. Many 
children are working under hazardous and unhygienic conditions during long time (Majumdar (2001), Basu, 
(1999)). Children have physical and psychological weaknesses when they start working too early (Lopez-Calva, 
2001). Some argue that child labor is a welfare loss for developing countries since children who are working at 
an early age may not attend schools. Children miss opportunities to acquire human capital for their potential 
earnings. In their theoretical model and in their empirical research on Brazilian child labor, Emerson and Seuza 
(2002) state that children who did not work, receive higher salaries later, therefore, the potential human capital 
earnings through working as children are prevailed over by the human capital earnings receiving through 
education. Moreover, they found that children who are working end up with lower gains. Consequently, 
according to them, the most appropriate policy is to assist families rather than children. According Emerson and 
Seuza (2002) policies should focus on breaking the vicious cycle: involve a one-time transfer of a critical level 
of resources to a family rather than general support of children’s education. So, compulsory education is a 
limited option to solve the problems. Since, there is a significant relationship between a parent’s labor incidence 
and years of schooling and those of their children (Emerson and Seuza, 2002). Thus, child labor as an adult earns 
less than an individual who was not a child labor and child labor more likely sends his own children to work. 
Lopez-Calva (2001) has a similar argument since according to her, Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Scola in Brazil 
are the examples for which compulsory education is not sufficient reducing of child labor can be attained by 
financially compensation the 
families for the economic cost of sending their children to work. Moreover, Buchmann (2000) argues that child 
labor is not a reason for forgoing school. Majumdar (2001) also states that school attendance is not the exact 
inverse of child labor, since children either combine these two activities and do none and remain idle. 
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Contrarily, Fentiman and Hall (1999) indicate that child labor is a major reason for low enrollment and dropouts 
in developing countries. Agricultural occupations (farming, fishing and cattle rearing) are labor intensive and 
households depend on child labor to support farms. However, Buchmann (2000) argues that child labor consists 
of only a small portion of school absences. Her analysis in Kenya indicates that less than 2% of absences are due 
to child labor. The main reasons for absences from school are sickness or failure to pay school expenses. Maitra 
and Ray (2002) state that schooling decreases with age, number of children, and poverty, and schooling increases 
with urbanization, female education, and infrastructure (road, electricity, and water). Fentiman and Hall (1999) 
suggest that school schedules can fit children’s labor-intensive periods (such as the planting or harvesting 
seasons). Buchmann (2000) advises to educate children according to needs of labor markets, to avoid gender 
discrimination in employment, and to decrease the excessive costs of schooling for poor families rather than to 
convince parents to favor education and abolish child labor. 
Andvig (2001) points out that family controls play key roles for child labor in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, 
95 % of child labor in Africa takes place in relatives’ houses or businesses. Families retain strict control over 
children even though they may work outside or even live outside of the family home (Andvig, 2001). 
Psacharapoulos (1997) has advocated restricting child labor due to two reasons: health conditions and foregone 
earnings. Many children are working under hazardous and unhygienic conditions for extended periods of time 
(Majumdar (2001), Basu, (1999)). Children exhibit physical and psychological weaknesses when they start 
working at early ages. (Lopez-Calva, 2001). Child labor is a welfare loss for developing countries since children 
who are working at an early age usually cannot attend schools (Psacharapoulos, 1997).  In this paper, I do not 
examine the welfare implications of child labor but focus on how education enrollment is associated with child 
labor. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will discuss education and poverty arguments. Section 3 will deal 
with methodology and variables. Section 4 presents empirical results and a conclusion will follow in section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Poverty Arguments 
 
Children miss opportunities to acquire human capital for their potential earnings. In their theoretical model and 
in their empirical research on Brazilian child labor, Emerson and Seuza (2002) state that people who did not 
work as children receive higher salaries later in life; therefore, the potential human capital earnings from child 
labor are dwarfed by the potential human capital earnings received through education. Moreover, they found that 
children who are working end up with lower gains. Consequently, according to them, the most appropriate policy 
is to assist families rather than children. According to Emerson and Seuza (2002) policies should focus on 
breaking the vicious cycle: involve a one-time transfer of a critical level of resources to a family rather than 
general support of children’s education. Therefore we see that compulsory education alone has limited capability 
to reduce child labor. There is a significant relationship between a parent’s labor incidence and years of 
schooling and those of their children (Emerson and Seuza, 2002). A child laborer will be more likely to send his 
own children to work.  
Lopez-Calva (2001) has a similar argument.  According to her, Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Scola in Brazil are 
examples showing that compulsory education alone is not sufficient to reduce the incidence of child labor. For 
such reductions to take place, families must be financially compensated for the income lost when they send their 
children to school. Moreover, Buchmann (2000) argues that child labor is not a reason for foregoing school.  
Contrarily, Fentiman and Hall (1999) indicate that child labor is a major reason for low educational 
enrollment and dropouts in developing countries. Agricultural occupations (farming, fishing and cattle rearing) 
are labor intensive and households depend on child labor to support farms. However, Buchmann (2000) 
argues that child labor accounts for only a small portion of school absences. Her analysis in Kenya indicates 
that less than 2% of absences are due to child labor. The main reasons for absences from school are sickness or 
inability to pay school expenses. Maitra and Ray (2002) state that schooling decreases with age, number of 
children, and poverty, while schooling increases with urbanization, female education, and infrastructure (road, 
electricity, and water). Fentiman and Hall (1999) suggest that school schedules can fit children’s labor-
intensive periods (such as the planting or harvesting seasons). Buchmann (2000) advises that children should 
be educated according to the needs of the labor markets in order to avoid gender discrimination in employment.  
He suggests that this will also decrease the excessive costs of schooling for poor families and will convince 
parents to favor education and abolish child labor.  
Basu (1999) also argues that education does not only provide higher income opportunities to children but also 
keeps children away from work. He concludes that compulsory education is a more desirable policy than 
banning child labor. 
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According to Basu (1999), labor market equilibria take two possible forms: either wages are insufficient for 
subsistence and children must work or wages are high enough and children do not work. Income level is 
important since people with higher incomes meet their needs and do not need their childrens’ wages. Child labor 
mainly starts from poverty. Table 1 presents education and labor participation according to income quintiles in 
Ghana. As we climb the expenditure quintiles (from 1 to 5), participation in the labor market decreases and 
enrolment in schooling increases. Moreover, the decrease of work and the increase of school are not proportional. 
This indicates that schooling and working are not opposites of each other. The micro-based research by 
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) support our conclusion since they find that subsidies for education raise the 
enrollment rate but do not have any impact on child labor in Bangladesh. 
Grooataert (1988) also shows that the ratio of children working falls with income in Ivory Coast (Table 2). The 
straightforward result is that almost half of child workers come from very poor families. Maitra and Ray (2002) 
argue that in developing countries the income contributions from child laborers are high. They indicate that 
the shares of household income contributed by child labor earnings are 10%, 24% and 30% in Peru, Pakistan and 
Ghana. Manabi (2001) also emphasizes that the existence of child labor is due to the need for economic security. 
In that sense, child labor may exist to stabilize as well as increase income.  
 
 
2.2. Income Inequality Argument 
 
Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) argue that if income is equally distributed in a country, child labor will not exist. 
Chiu (1998) states that greater income inequality implies lower human capital, which impedes economic growth.  
The link between income inequality and low educational attainment may work through child labor. 
Those families, whose incomes are high, do not send their children to the labor market, which refers to a luxury 
axiom (Basu and Van, 1998). On the other hand, high-income level is not sufficient regarding distribution axiom, 
income should be more equitably distributed among families (Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999). Hence, the vicious 
circle is established: children are working due to unequal income distribution. Since they could not become 
skillful workers (or involve in entrepreneurial activities), they constantly earn a subsistence income. 
In the basic model of Basu and Van (1998), a family sends its children to the labor market if each individual’s 
consumption falls below the subsistence consumption, c in the first equation. More formally, Basu and Van 
(1998) note labor participation of child labor as follows: 
( ) 0    if 
( ) 1    if 
A A
A A
e w w c
e w w c
= ≥
= <
                         (1) 
 
In this equation, e indicates whether children work or not. When the wage of adult, wa is greater than subsistence 
consumption, children do not work.  
According to Swinnerton and Rogers (1999), macro economic conditions of child labor regarding income 
inequality reflect the "distribution axiom." Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) makes an additional assumption about 
the budget of the family:  
 
( , ) 0    if 
( , ) 1    if 
A A
A A
e w X w X c
e w X w X c
= + ≥
= + <
        (2) 
 
 X stands for dividends. According to them, dividends will improve income distribution. Hence, households will 
not send their kids to school. We may categorize the countries as follows: for those whose have equal income 
distribution, e (*, *) is equal to zero, and for those who have unequal income distribution, e (*, *) is equal to one.   
 
2.3. Capital Market Argument 
 
Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) argue that those families whose incomes fall below a poverty threshold level send their 
children to the labor market. They state that an enlargement of credit opportunities can be an effective policy. 
They also argue that under imperfect credit markets, subsidizing education is a better option than increasing 
returns to schooling since they claim that the primary obstacle to schooling is poverty rather than the poor return 
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to education. They state that an increase of credit opportunities can be an effective policy. They also argue that 
under imperfect credit markets, subsidizing education is a better option than increasing returns to schooling since 
they claim that the primary obstacle to schooling is poverty rather than the poor return to education. In this 
context, Basu (1999) supports this argument since he states that in most cases leaving school is not due to 
persistent poverty but to a temporary but severe income reduction in the household.  
 
 
2.4. Rural Economy Argument 
According to Manabi (2001), child labor is largely a rural phenomenon in India. 92% of the total child workers 
reside in rural areas and are employed in agricultural activities. Education opportunities may concentrate in 
urban areas1 and rural families may send children to work. Based on research for Ghana and Ivory Coast, rural 
population and the relative size of agriculture are potential determining factors for child labor (Maitra and Ray, 
2002 and Grootaert, 1998). The sub-Saharan African cases support the distinctions in child labor regarding rural 
and urban economies. Table 3 shows that children from rural areas are more likely to work and forgo schooling. 
World Bank (1998) confirms this conclusion for Ethiopia.  
Table 4 indicates that in Botswana, boys usually allocate their time to animal tending when they are working. 
Girls usually work in the house and very rarely involved in crop husbandry. 
 
2.5. Export Banned Argument 
Opponents’ of child labor argue to implement high tariffs (Basu, 1999). On the other hand, Jafarey and Lahiri 
(2001) (2002) stress that tariff sanctions from developed countries to developing countries will not work since 
only 5 % of children are employed in the tradable sector. Moreover, they state that child workers in the tradable 
sectors do not choose education but switch to more hazardous jobs. Basu (2003) analyzes this argument as part 
of an effort to protect jobs from foreign competition concealed as a concern for impoverished children. For 
instance, in the 1990s, opponents of child labor implement restrictions for hand-knotted carpets made by children. 
Many Nepalese carpet makers laid children off. As a result, between 5000 and 7000 girls became prostitutes 
(Basu, 2003).  
 
 
 
2.6. Other Arguments 
 
An important fraction of foreign aid (% of GDP) is allocated for reducing child labor. U.S. Department of 
Labor’s International Child Labor Program has donated $112 million to eliminate child labor since 1995. This 
foreign aid has been used to diminish child trafficking and the prevalence of child soldiers as well as to limit 
children’s role in commercial agriculture.   
Fentiman and Hall (1999) and Andvig (2001) stress the lack of infrastructure as a determinant of child labor. In 
western countries, child labor was decreased by technological improvements in the agricultural sector (Riney-
Kehrberg, 2001). Advances in mechanization allow machines to replace human and often child labor (Riney-
Kehrberg, 2001).  Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) and Riney-Kehrberg, (2001) state that technological 
development, industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture lower child labor dependency in economic 
activities.    
Low population growth (annual %) may associate with low child labor participation since parents may 
emphasize the quality of children rather than quantity and so send their children to schools (Becker and Tomes, 
1976). 
 
3. Methodology and Data Analysis 
 
To evaluate whether education conditions are strongly linked to child labor, a pooled cross-sectional time series 
fixed-effect GLS model for 44 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1960 and 1999 is applied. The dependent 
variable is child labor (% of total). The weakness of the dependent variable is that it takes into account only 
those who are working outside the home. The structure of the regression equation is the following: 
 
 
                                                          
1 For a survey of the urban bias literature, see Lipton (1993). 
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 Child labor=    αi + β (Primary education) + ∏ (Control Variables)+ uit      (1) 
i=1,2,..44 countries.  t=1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, 1998, 19992. 
 
αi is a country specific intercept, β and ∏ are the estimated coefficients on the independent variables and uit is 
an error term.  
The impact of education is measured in the participation of primary school enrollment as a proxy of educational 
attainment. The weakness is that the measurement of primary school enrollment indicates a gross enrollment 
ratio regardless of age. However, child laborers only span the 10-14 age group.  
GDP per capita is used to control for the level of development. Not only might this influence current income but 
also might be associated with future returns to current education. Moreover, poverty makes the marginal utility 
of income very high and induces substitution away from non-labor activities such as leisure and education 
(Jafarey and Lahiri, 2004). On the other hand, GDP per capita as a poverty proxy has some weaknesses. First, 
GDP per capita omits many economic activities (especially, home activities). Second, economic agents do not 
report their income due to tax evasion in developing countries.  
Technological backwardness may force children to work rather than attend school. In western countries, child 
labor was decreased by technological improvements in the agricultural sector (Riney-Kehrberg, 2001). Advances 
in mechanization allow machines to replace human and often child labor (Riney-Kehrberg, 2001). In terms of 
mechanization of agriculture,3 the number of tractors (per hectare) is used as a proxy.   
The lack of credit facilities makes borrowing more costly for poor families to forego present income by sending 
their children to school (Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002). The depth of the credit market has been calculated in different 
ways (Asiedu, 2002 and Levine4, 2003).  As in Asiedu (2002), I use M2/GDP as a proxy for the depth of the 
credit market. 
The distance to a school can influence school enrollment, especially in rural areas (Jensen and Nielsen, 1997).  In 
this research, rural population (%) as a percent of the total population is an additional control variable and falls 
in line with Jensen and Nielsen (1997). Educational opportunities are concentrated in urban areas and rural 
families are most likely to send children to work. Moreover, the distance to school can be an obstacle in rural 
areas (Jensen and Nielsen, 1997).  
The quality-quantity argument is important for the schooling decision. It is anticipated that those families who 
care about quality rather than the quantity of children will send children to school. To control for the quality-
quantity tradeoff, I use the population growth rate.  Low population growth may be associated with low child 
labor participation since parents with fewer children will be more likely to emphasize the quality of their 
children rather than the quantity.  In other words, they will not view children as immediate income resources for 
their families and they will send their children to school (Becker and Tomes 1976).    
  Table 5 presents summary statistics and indicates that child labor has fallen by 40% from 1960 to 1999. 
In the same period, the rural population fell by 25% and GDP per capita increased by 100%. Education in the 
primary level reached over 80%. The average number of tractors has increased from 7 tractors per 10,000 
hectares to 21 tractors per 10,000 hectares. Population growth is above 2% in the entire period. Money usage 
extended from 2% to 21%. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In model  in table 6, the arable land and GDP per capita are negatively associated while the hectare per person 
and rural population are positively associated with child labor. They are highly statistically significant except 
hectare per person. This may confirm that the African child labor phenomenon is a rural characteristic as in the 
U.S. and New Zealand (Riney-Kehrberg , 2001) or in some other developing countries (Fentiman and Hall, 1999 
and Manabi , 2001). We may expect that child labor will fall down with urbanization. Results about GDP per 
capita show that income is an important factor in child labor (Maitra and Ray, 2002). Perhaps, being poor and 
residing in rural areas are interrelated each other. An interesting result is that arable land is negatively associated 
with child labor. This may indicate that easily cultivable land requires less human power, but fishing and cattle 
rearing need more intensive labor activity than farming. Table 7 confirms this conclusion since in Botswana, 
                                                          
2
 The data of World Bank (2003) for child labor is available for these years. 
3 Mechanization of agriculture is a broad concept and can include both fisheries and land. World Bank data 
(2003) is available for tractors, which is not relevant for fisheries. On the other hand, enlargement of the use of 
tractors can be an indicator of the general improvement in other agricultural sectors.  
4 Levine (2003) used the stock market.  
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boys mostly allocate their time for animal tending when they are working. Girls usually work in the house and 
very rarely in crop husbandry. 
Model 2 includes primary education variable. Primary education is negatively correlated and statistically 
significant. All variables keep their signs and significance levels but hectare per person. This variable becomes 
positive. This concludes that small or large land lots do not necessarily increase child labor usage. When we add 
secondary education into model 3, the coefficient of secondary education is negative and significant. When we 
test education in gender level in model 4, female primary education and male 
secondary education enrollments are effective lowering child labor. The sign of tertiary education in model 5 is 
negative but not significant. Primary education and secondary education keep their negative sign and statistical 
significance. This may conclude that age overlapping in education is crucial for reducing child labor. In this 
model, mechanization of agriculture significantly reduces child labor. This result supports Levy (1995)'s research 
in rural Egypt. According to Levy (1995), mechanization may decrease in child labor (hence, fertility). Children 
are charged of the cultivation of cotton, especially weeding and picking. Technological advancement in cropping 
reduces child labor. In model 6, the industrialization variable is negative but not significant. Our research results 
up to this point confirm the experiences of developed countries since compulsory education, substitution of labor 
by capital (mechanization), industrialization, and urbanization reduce child labor significantly (Riney-Kehrberg, 
2001). The same model shows that high population growth is associated with child labor. 
Table 8 starts with model 7, which is testing the impact of export on child labor. It is negative and statistically 
significant. Certainly, it is difficult to implement a policy for increasing export to reduce child labor. On the other 
hand, at least we are certain that export does not necessarily associate with child labor in sub-Saharan Africa 
( Jafarey and Lahiri , 2001). Model 8 is testing M2/GDP as a proxy of the depth of financial instruments. The 
result shows that the enlargement of financial instruments lowers child labor significantly. This finding supports 
Jafarey and Lahiri’s (2001) mathematical models on financial constraints and child labor. Their argument was 
that access to the financial market would reduce the needs of child labor for poor families. Model 9 includes 
foreign aid, which is negative and significantly correlated with child labor. So, 
international efforts may reduce child labor. Infant mortality rate under five year old in model 10 shows that 
families need less child labor force with the improvement of health conditions for children. Telephone lines per 
1000 are added into model 11 as a proxy of infrastructure. The result shows that improvement of infrastructure 
does not lower child labor. We may conclude that welfare improvement programs specifically designed for 
children such as the reduction of infant mortality rather than general welfare improvement programs such as the 
increase of telephone mainlines work better to overcome child labor problem. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
We can conclude the paper on child labor in sub-Saharan Africa: 
1. The African child labor phenomenon is a rural characteristic. We may expect that child labor will fall down 
with urbanization. 
2. Income is an important factor in child labor. Perhaps, being poor and residing in rural areas are interrelated 
each other. 
3. Arable land is negatively associated with child labor. This may indicate that easily cultivable land requires less 
human power but fishing and cattle rearing need more intensive labor activity than farming. Moreover, small or 
large land lots do not necessarily increase child labor usage. 
4. Primary, secondary and tertiary education is negatively correlated with child labor but primary and secondary 
education are significant. This may conclude that age overlapping in education is crucial for reducing child labor. 
5. Mechanization of agriculture significantly reduces child labor. 
6. Countries with high population growth have a larger child labor market. Lowering fertility rate can be a policy 
suggestion. 
7. Export does not necessarily associate with child labor in sub-Saharan Africa so putting tariffs on sub-Saharan 
African countries’ goods have no empirical grounds. 
8. The enlargement of financial instruments lowers child labor significantly. Access to the financial market will 
reduce the needs of child labor for poor families. 
9. Foreign aid is negative and significantly correlated with child labor. So, international efforts may reduce child 
labor. 
10. Our results also show that welfare improvement program specifically designed for children such as the 
reduction of infant mortality rather than general welfare improvement programs such as the increase of telephone 
mainlines works better to overcome child labor problem. 
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Table 1: Income and Education in Ghana 
Expenditure  
Quintile  
Work Only School Only Work and School None Working  
1 13.1 46.4 15.5 24.9 
2 6.8 54.1 21.7 17.3 
3 10.5 53.8 18.6 17.1 
4 8.7 55.2 19.2 17 
5 5.7 64.6 19.1 10.6 
Source: Canagarajahand and Coulombe (1997)  
 
 
Table 2: Child Labor Participation Rate in Ivory Coast 
Income Level Participation Rate 
Very Poor 43.9 
Mid Poor 21.9 
Not Poor 10.2 
All 15.3 
Source: Grootaert (1998) 
 
Table 3: Urban versus Rural in the Ivory Coast 
Location Schooling School and Work Work Only Home Caring and 
Idling 
Urban 39.3 36.6 3.7 20.3 
Rural 21.3 28.4 27.9 22.4 
All 28.5 31.7 18.3 21.5 
Source: Grootaert (1998)  
 
 
Table 4: Children's Time Allocation in Botswana (%) 
Activities Boys Girls 
Animal  
Tending 
28.8 3.5 
Trading .1 3.5 
Crop Husbandry 3 .5 
Wage Labor .4 3.5 
Hunting and Gathering 1.6 .8 
Repairing .5 2.6 
Child Care 1.7 .8 
Water Collection 2.3 5.5 
Housework 4.4 15.5 
Illness 1.5 2 
Schooling 13.7 17.4 
Leisure 43.5 41 
Source: Chernichovsky et al. (1985) 
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Table 5:  Summary Statistics by year:  average values over 44 sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
Labor 
force, 
children 
10-14 (% 
of age 
group)  
Rural 
population 
(% of total 
population)  
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
1995 US$)  
School 
enrollment, 
primary (% 
gross)  
Agricultural 
machinery, 
tractors per 
100 
hectares of 
arable land  
Population 
growth 
(annual %)  
Money and 
quasi 
money 
(M2) as % 
of GDP  
1960 40.33 83.18118 306.4543 0 0.079905 2.138477 2.217914 
1970 33.99 79.30486 443.9764 43.47677 0.159932 2.154725 9.112622 
1980 35.31477 75.86225 591.56 65.77336 0.199251 2.756098 15.00523 
1990 31.92045 69.73882 743.3984 67.74066 0.235399 2.73663 20.57893 
1995 29.87318 66.53602 724.2378 73.74437 0.229661 2.664527 35.30724 
1998 28.60214 64.65455 783.4252 77.29975 0.22101 2.547836 21.40339 
1999 28.12973 63.94161 796.3234 77.94298 0.219591 2.440439 21.03718 
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Table 6: Dependent Variables: Child Labor(%) 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Arable Land 
 
-0.201 
(-7.346)*** 
 
-0.131 
(-3.885)*** 
-0.1089 
(-2.786)*** 
 
-0.17 
(-3.675)*** 
 
-0.0249 
(-0.428) 
 
-0.051 
(-.747) 
 
Hectare per 
person 
 
0.015 
(1.562719) 
 
-0.0159 
(-0.583) 
 
-0.014237 
(-.388) 
 
0.0081 
(.201) 
 
-1.699 
(-.783) 
 
-1.089 
(-.423) 
 
Rural 
Population 
 
0.401 
(30.562)*** 
 
0.387 
(18.277)*** 
 
0.345633 
(14.3)*** 
 
0.295416 
(11.58)*** 
 
0.323 
(9.594)*** 
 
0.331 
(8.228)*** 
 
GDP capita 
 
-0.0029 
(-13.51)*** 
 
-0.003 
(-9.10)*** 
 
-0.001631 
(-4.759)*** 
 
-0.00247 
(-6.009*** 
 
-0.0026 
(-4.571)*** 
 
-0.0026 
(-3.75)*** 
 
Education 
primary 
 
 -0.0575 
(-6.825)*** 
 
 -0.055861 
(-5.138)*** 
 
-0.051 
(-3.44)*** 
 
-0.0781 
(-5.314)*** 
 
Education 
Secondary 
 
  -0.058302 
(-3.502)*** 
 
 -0.045 
(-2.059)** 
 
 
0.0154 
(.486)*** 
 
Education 
primary 
(female) 
 
   -0.081 
(-4.61)*** 
 
  
Education 
primary 
(male) 
 
   0.032266 
(1.912)** 
 
  
Education 
Secondary 
(female) 
 
   -0.020813 
(-.719) 
 
  
Education 
Secondary 
(male) 
 
   -0.064138 
(-2.18)** 
 
  
Education 
Tertiary 
 
    -0.226 
(-1.449) 
 
-0.244 
(-1.413) 
 
Agriculture 
Mechanization 
 
    -0.0682 
(-2.218)** 
 
-0.0992 
(-3.05)*** 
 
Industry Value 
Added 
 
     -0.0184 
(-.732) 
 
Pop. Growth 
 
     1.412 
(3.803)*** 
 
N 
 
250 
 
211 
 
199 
 
197 
 
168 
 
164 
 
       
Note: the values in the parentheses are t-statistics 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
** denotes significance at the 5% level 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level 
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Table 7: Children's Time Allocation in Botswana (%) 
Activities 
 
Boys 
 
Girls 
 
Animal 
Tending 
 
28.8 
 
3.5 
 
Trading 
 
.1 
 
3.5 
 
Crop Husbandry 
 
3 
 
.5 
 
Wage Labor 
 
.4 
 
3.5 
 
Hunting and Gathering 
 
1.6 
 
.8 
 
Repairing 
 
.5 
 
2.6 
 
Child Care 
 
1.7 
 
.8 
 
Water Collection 
 
2.3 
 
5.5 
 
Housework 
Illness 
 
4.4 
1.5 
 
15.5 
2 
 
Schooling 
 
13.7 
 
17.4 
 
Leisure 
 
43.5 
 
41 
 
 
Source: Chernichovsky et al. (1985) 
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Table 8: Dependent Variables: Child Labor(%) 
 Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
 
Model 11 
 
Arable Land 
 
-0.0051 
(-.082) 
 
 
-0.0836 
(-0.997) 
-0.085 
(-1.22) 
 
-0.106582(-.765) 
 
-0.0718 
(-.94) 
 
Hectare per person 
 
1.272179 
(.656) 
 
0.054031 
(0.019378) 
 
-1.134606 
(-.49) 
 
0.314801 
(.061) 
 
-1.794 
(-.536) 
 
Rural Population 
 
0.284 
(8.608)*** 
 
0.284602 
(7.050898) 
 
 
0.308057 
(8.869)*** 
 
0.324408(4.739)*** 
 
0.3134 
(7.44)*** 
 
GDP capita 
 
-0.0025 
(-3.916)*** 
 
-0.00258 
(-2.908981) 
 
-0.001950 
(2.51)*** 
 
-0.000141 
(-.078) 
 
-0.000632 
(-.5) 
 
Education primary 
 
-0.0743 
(-5.07)*** 
 
-0.0599 
(-3.900404 
 
-0.059408 
(-4.58)*** 
 
-0.126296 
(-3.39)*** 
 
-0.135863 
(-5.58)*** 
 
Education Secondary 
 
0.0134 
(.419) 
 
-0.0214 
(-0.549828) 
 
-0.026149 
(-.78) 
 
0.015736 
(.239) 
 
0.016995 
(.37) 
 
Education Tertiary 
 
-0.1919 
(-1.247) 
 
-0.127 
(-0.650996 
 
-0.234 
(-1.45) 
 
-0.392750 
(.97) 
 
-0.539775 
(2.27)** 
 
Agriculture 
Mechanization 
 
-0.0906 
(-2.76)*** 
 
-.116 
(-2.29) 
 
-0.122 
(-3.06)*** 
 
-0.179653 
(-1.42) 
 
-0.157 
(-2.27)** 
 
Pop. Growth 
 
1.319 
(3.25)*** 
 
1.338 
(2.893) 
 
1.655 
(4.19)*** 
 
3.230065 
(2.92)*** 
 
3.1529 
(4.12)*** 
 
Exports of goods 
 
-0.1 
(-4.89)*** 
 
    
M2/GDP 
 
 -0.096 
(-3.0182)*** 
 
-0.078 
(-2.84)*** 
 
-0.087532 
(-1.24) 
 
-0.0712 
(-1.43) 
 
Foreign Aid 
 
  -0.0723 
(-2.95)*** 
 
-0.078461 
(-1.40) 
 
-0.0796 
(-2.31)** 
 
Infant Mortality Rate 
 
   -0.039478 
(-1.93)** 
 
-0.0358 
(-2.55)** 
 
Telephone Mainlines 
 
    0.016198 
(.41) 
 
N 
 
162 
 
158 
 
156 
 
121 
 
 
115 
 
 
Note: the values in the parentheses are t-statistics 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
** denotes significance at the 5% level 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 
